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Available online xxxxInfrastructure is a means to an end: it is built, maintained and expanded in order to enable the
functioning of society. Present infrastructure operation is characterised by: governance based on
unmanaged growing demand, which is both inefficient and ultimately unsustainable; lack of
integration of the end-users, in terms of the variety of theirwants, needs and behaviours; separate
and parallel delivery of different infrastructure streams prohibiting joint solutions. To achieve
long-term sustainability, infrastructure needs to be designed and operated to provide essential
service delivery at radically decreased levels of resource use. This new approach will need to:
(1) incorporate the end-user, in terms of their wants and behaviours; (2) focus on the service
provided; (3) use Information and Communication Technologies more effectively; (4) integrate
the operation of different infrastructure systems; (5) be governed in a manner that
recognises the complexity and interconnectedness of infrastructure systems; and (6) rethink
current infrastructure valuation. Possible configurations incorporating these aspects with the
explicit goal of contributing to long-term sustainability could be Multi-Utility Service Companies
or “MUSCos”. This article presents new insights and ideas generated by considering the challenge
of the transition towards a MUSCo infrastructure.
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Multi-Utility Service Company (MUSCo)1. Introduction
Infrastructure is a means to an end: it is built, maintained
and expanded in order to enable the functioning of society. In
turn, however, the technical building blocks of infrastructure
and its geographic layout determine, to a large extent, the levelstitute, School of Earth
el.: +44 113 34 32656.
nc. This is an open access articand composition of a society's resource demand, leading to
long-term locking in of certain types of resource dependency
and uses (Unruh, 2000). For example, on average the UK
replaces its infrastructure at a rate of 1–2% per year, meaning
that the decisions we make today regarding infrastructure
will be with us for 50–100 years. Perhaps more surprisingly,
physical infrastructure also shapes the institutional and social
organisation of a society, through a historical process of change
and evolution described as “co-evolution” (Foxon, 2011). This
implies that changing infrastructure operation necessarilyle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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improvements.
Infrastructure is commonly referred to as the physical
networks of water and energy supply, communication, trans-
portation, andwaste removal and treatment (e.g. Infrastructure
UK, 2011), but increasingly incorporates the built environment
as well. The present form of infrastructure operation consists of
separate supply systems provisioning unconstrained demand:
the demand is viewed unquestioningly as the “needs” of society
which infrastructure must, somehow, reliably supply. This
mode of operation has served industrialised societies well so
far. However, defining the mission of infrastructure as the
unerring supply of a growing demand is risky and ultimately
unsustainable. Unlimited growth in demand means unlimited
pressures on ecosystems and natural resources at a time when
we are already well beyond our planetary safe operating space
(Rockstrom et al., 2009).
From the perspective of societal resilience and security of
supply, a system which understands and manages demand is
arguably more robust than one of unlimited dependence
on external, most often imported, inputs (Foresight, 2008).
Achieving this outcome with the current configuration of the
infrastructure system presents a number of challenges:
(1) Governance based on unmanaged growing demand is
both inefficient and unsustainable (e.g. increasing
capacity of road transport networks leading to higher
road usage and similar congestion known as “induced
traffic” (Hills, 1996; Goodwin, 1996; Noland, 2001;
Metz, 2008));
(2) Current design and operation do not integrate the end-
users, in terms of the variety of their wants and needs, and
behaviours (e.g. car ownership as unique transport
mode) and their crucial role in selecting and using
technological options (e.g. selection and appropriate
operation of energy efficient technologies); and
(3) Separate and parallel delivery of different infrastructure
streams prohibits the development of potential joint
solutions (e.g. co-treatment of waste and wastewater),
or even substitutions (e.g. substitution of electricity with
gas through micro-combined heat and power (CHP)),
between infrastructure systems.
These characteristics of current infrastructure operation
act as obstacles to technical innovation and longer term
sustainability. To achieve long-term sustainability infrastructure
needs to be designed and operated with the goal of providing
essential service delivery at radically decreased levels of
resource. This requires a new approach to research that goes
beyond analysis of individual failures to take a more systemic
view of the purpose of infrastructure. This new approach will
need to:
• Incorporate the end-user, in terms of their wants, behaviours
and technological choices;
• Be focused on the service provided (e.g. thermal comfort)
rather than supply of the vector (e.g. gas);
• Use Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)
and data more effectively to connect end-users to infrastruc-
ture systems;
• Integrate the operation of different infrastructure systems;• Be governed in a manner that recognises the complexity and
interconnectedness of infrastructure systems; and
• Rethink current infrastructure valuation.
We termed configurations that incorporate most of these
aspects with the explicit goal of contributing to long-term
sustainability, as Multi-Utility Service Companies or “MUSCos”.
A MUSCo is an entity which delivers services to end-users, as
opposed to electricity, gas, petrol or water. Since the payment
to the MUSCo is on the basis of service, the costs of energy,
water andmaterial resources required for realising that service
are internalised by the MUSCo: the MUSCo doesn't profit from
selling energy or other resources, it profits most by saving
them, by providing the highest level of service at the lowest
level of resource used (Steinberger et al., 2009; Stahel, 2010).
The relation between a MUSCo and its customers would be
established through performance-based contracts on agreed
levels of service delivery, rather than by metering and billing
physical resource use. A MUSCo could be a single organisation,
or more likely a coalition of several different entities (including
local authorities, technology providers and maintenance pro-
viders, for instance). A MUSCo would address the interconnec-
tedness of infrastructure, since a single service required by
the end-user could potentially be delivered through different
technological options, using different mixes and qualities
of physical resources. This definition of a MUSCo is clearly
inspired by the niche market of Energy Service Companies
(Marino et al., 2011; Hannon, 2012), but extends it beyond
energy and beyond the usual business-to-business arena with
the goal of contributing to massive, systematic economy-wide
resource savings of the scale required by climate change
mitigation, for example.
This article discusses this novel approach, and presents new
insights and ideas generated by considering the challenge of the
transition towards MUSCo-like infrastructure configurations.
The first part of the article is concerned with the micro-level,
starting with an analysis of the infrastructure as though the
end-user mattered, including infrastructure services, owner-
ship and control, and service quality, followed by a section on
data requirements for enabling action on the user–infrastruc-
ture interface. The macro-level is covered in the second part,
where the complexity and governance of integrated infrastruc-
ture operation are addressed, and the valuation of infrastruc-
ture is discussed.We conclude with a discussion of the findings
and describe research required to accelerate the transition
towards a more resource-efficient and service-oriented infra-
structure bridging the gap between themicro- andmacro-scale.
2. Infrastructure as though the end-user mattered
2.1. Does the end-user matter?
Society's ultimate requirements of water, energy, commu-
nication, transportation and waste removal (in terms of overall
volume and peaks of provision) are dictated by the aggregate
demand of end-users.Measuring efficiency using the volume of
utility products delivered (measured as kWh or passenger
kilometre travelled, for instance) as the quantity to optimise,
whilst excluding the end-users who set the level of demand,
prevents the consideration of some of the most effective
measures. Some would argue that demand management
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increasing examples of demand management measures across
infrastructure sectors to shift peakdemand (e.g. energy (Carley,
2012), water (Russell and Fielding, 2010), and transport
(Eriksson et al., 2006)). However a narrow focus on peak
demand neglects the crucial role of the end-user in terms of
theirwants, behaviours and technical choices,which are critical
to infrastructure operation in general, and to resource-efficient
infrastructure operation in particular. We elaborate on these
additional roles below.
The most promising cost-effective technologies for effi-
ciency improvements are often found at the end-user level
(McKinsey and Co, 2009; WB, 2009). Involving multiple and
diverse actors and measures (as is the case with end-user
centredmeasures)might bemore difficult to implement than a
small number of large scale supply side initiatives. This should
not prevent action at this scale, since such distribution of
measures across the actor landscape allows for faster technol-
ogy learning and better risk distribution (environmental and
economic) in case of failure (Grubler, 2010; Grubler et al.,
2012).
End-user attitudes, beliefs, habits or routines, personal
capabilities, and contextual factors have been identified as
barriers to the adoption of cost-effective technologies in
studies across different infrastructure streams (e.g. trans-
portation (Eriksson et al., 2006), energy (Faiers et al., 2007),
water (Russell and Fielding, 2010)). Lack of information about
emerging technologies and/or personal resource performance
(e.g. energy and water consumption (Faruqui et al., 2010)),
as well as the economic ownership and benefit conflicts
(e.g. principal agent problem (Murtishaw and Sathaye, 2006))
appear frequently among the contextual factors limiting the
exploitation of efficient technologies' full potential (Steinberger
et al., 2009; Jaffe et al., 1999).
In fact, new technologies co-evolve with end-users' behav-
iour and organisational networks (Janssen and Jager, 2002;
Rycroft andKash, 2002) potentially leading to lock-in situations
(Unruh, 2000). Furthermore, the end-user provides a point of
integration for infrastructure streams since certain services
(e.g. hygiene, mobility) require a combination of infrastructure
networks. Such bundling of different infrastructure streams at
the end-user level allows for new cross-sectorial efficiency
solutions through novel integrated contractual agreements.
Therefore, the end-user is essential for adoption of cost effective
technologies and provides a key role in integrated infrastruc-
ture systems.
2.2. Delivering infrastructure services
In the last decade, researchers from different fields have put
forward ideas for overcoming end-users' efficiency barriers
under the titles of performance, functional or service economy
(Stahel, 2010;Mont and Tukker, 2006). In parallel, similar ideas
developed from the business and marketing perspective
(Gronroos, 2011; Vargo and Lusch, 2008) promoting the co-
creation of value for both customers and providers, and from
measuring ecosystem services (Loring et al., 2008). In general
these ideas require a fundamental shift: away from selling
products or metered quantities of utility products (e.g. kWh of
electricity, gas or litres of water), and towards selling “services”
(such as thermal comfort, illumination and cleanliness), whichcan be defined as the ultimate goal of the product or utility
product purchased.
Fig. 1 illustrates such a shift in the energy system by
comparing the traditional throughput-based energy economy,
where transactions are based on units of products delivered,
with a performance-based energy economy, where profits are
based on energy savings (Steinberger et al., 2009).
At the product level the term ‘product service systems’
(PSS) is often used to describe such new commercial arrange-
ments (Mont, 2002). They are generally based on leasing,
allowing more flexible ownership which might lead to
extended product life-time and higher efficiency level in the
supply stream (Mont and Tukker, 2006). However, PSS usually
do not include contractual agreements on guaranteed resource
savings, or reference to baseline end-user performance.
At the infrastructure level, the potential and diffusion of
Energy Service Companies (ESCos) have been analysed and
reviewed in many countries, and across a variety of sectors
(Marino et al., 2011; Vine, 2005). The ESCo business model
relies on a guaranteed provision of energy service provided at a
lower level of energy consumption (Sorrell, 2007). Although
previous studies agree on the beneficial nature of ESCo
operation for the implementation of energy and cost-efficient
technologies (IEA, 2012), they also point at the considerable
obstacles related to mainstreaming ESCos. High transaction
costs for small clients and high asset specificity for large
customers are currently the main barriers for further ESCo
mainstreaming, particularly in the domestic sector. Standard-
ized contracts, monitoring and accreditation schemes for ESCos
might be required to overcome the above mentioned barriers
(Sorrell, 2007). This in turn might increase the adoption of
service-oriented contracts and supports a transfer of the energy
service model to other infrastructure systems.
It is anticipated that service-oriented models would not
only increase adoption of existing resource efficient and cost-
effective technologies but could also bring about a change in
the operation of these technologies, through contractual
clauses concerning accepted modes of operation. A prominent
example of this is car sharing, where a change in operation
mode drastically increases efficiency whilst remaining cost-
effective for a large part of the population (Prettenthaler and
Steininger, 1999). Such a shift from a product to a service
economy provides a fundamentally different perspective of
how end-users could satisfy their wants and needs at reduced
levels of resource consumption.
2.3. Technology choice vs. behavioural change
The resource consumption of a service is defined by the
end-users' final demand as well as how efficiently utility
products are converted into the service required. The efficiency
of such conversion itself depends on the conversion technol-
ogies in place (i.e. active appliances converting utility products
into the service required), their passive context (Cullen et al.,
2011; Cullen and Allwood, 2010) and how end-users operate
these technologies. Current efficiency initiatives either focus on
changing end-users' final demand (i.e. behaviour) or end-users'
conversion technologies.
The majority of the relevant literature is focused on energy
and water. Energy receives the broadest coverage, where
efficiency initiatives target a change of conversion technologies
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of traditional vs. performance-based incentive structure.
Based on Steinberger et al. (2009).
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2012; Faiers et al., 2007; Faruqui et al., 2010; Linden et al., 2006;
Boardman, 2004; Peacock and Newborough, 2005). Besides
some retrofitting and grey-water reuse, most initiatives in the
water sector concentrate on end-users' behaviour (e.g. Russell
and Fielding, 2010; Olmstead and Stavins, 2009; Arregui et al.,
2012;Willis et al., 2011; Carragher et al., 2012). In the transport
sector the behaviour related topics are teleworking and eco-
driving (e.g. Mokhtarian and Salomon, 1997; Barkenbus, 2010),
and changing commuter schedules tomove away from times of
peak demand (Ben-Elia and Ettema, 2009; Hensher and
Puckett, 2007). Changing transportation modes corresponds
to the choice of conversion technologies (e.g. Eriksson et al.,
2006; Smith, 2008).
Although behavioural change plays an important part for a
transition towards more resource-efficient infrastructure op-
eration, the active appliances in place limit its impact. We
define active appliances as appliances which consume consid-
erable amounts of energy and/or resources during their use
phase. With the current development of increasing efficiencies
a high replacement rate is key but might lose its importance
once the efficiencies are maximised (Fernandez, 2001; Kim
et al., 2003; Young, 2008). Apart from their actual design life,
their replacement rates largely depend on the financial model
of ownership. The two generic types of ownership are the
classic product purchase, and an operating lease; where the
lessor retains ownership and certainmaintenance tasks and the
lessee has possession and use of the asset for a prefixed
payment period (Clark, 1978). In the classic ownership model
active appliances are usually replaced at the end of their
lifetime, independent of efficiency improvements of new
products. Replacement rates for end-user conversion technol-
ogies are significantly higher in leasing agreements and
increase further if the product life span is optimised for energy
consumption, and remanufacturing of the asset is included
(Intlekofer et al., 2010). Offering attractive loans combinedwith rebates has been found most effective in influencing
residential choices towards high-efficiency appliances (Train
and Atherton, 1995).
Another key aspect of active appliances is their embedding
in a passive context, such as the built environment. Cullen et al.
(2011) show that in building systems the largest energy
savings are possible through improvement of the passive
heating/cooling system (98% of practical available saving
potential untapped) although appliances themselves offer
considerable improvements (67% available savings untapped).
Such improvements are based on mature technological
innovations such as the Passivhaus standard, but will only
achieve their full potential when appropriately used and
maintained, which requires changing end-users behaviour
(Hinnells, 2008). Appropriate use and maintenance is more
likely to occur in mixed ownership models, where end-users
and utility providers share risk and revenues (Steinberger et al.,
2009; Sorrell, 2007), see also Bertoldi et al. (2013) for a further
discussion. Hence high performance and guaranteed efficiency
delivery are most likely to occur when a change from
ownership to leasing-with-savings model for active appliances
is encouraged, and end-users are supported with expertise,
financing, and maintenance. Efficiency initiatives should there-
fore target end-users' service demand, as well as active
appliances, their passive context and an appropriate use and
maintenance of these conversion technologies.
2.4. Bespoke quality
Utilities are provided to end-users at quality standards that
have been established principally as a result of historical
events, rather than practical needs (often referred to as path
dependency), and are enforced by strict regulatorymeasures. A
clear example of this path dependency and lock-in is power
generation and transmission, commonly referred to as “thewar
of currents” (e.g. McNichol, 2006). Historically power was
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increasingly large distances to end-users, requiring high
voltages during transmission (to limit potential transfer losses)
but low voltages at the end-user (for safety reasons). More
efficient voltage transformers for alternating current (AC)
compared to direct current (DC) transformers favoured AC for
power transmission, and led to a physical lock-in to a highly
standardized AC power system.
These standards are provided and regulated regardless of
whether they are still required to meet the needs of end-users.
If we start from the point of view of the actual service required,
which is usually the output of an active appliance converting
the utility product, not all services would need utilities of the
same quality, and we could accept some flexibility in the
quality and reliability of utilities provided. Instead of conven-
tional and arbitrary standards, bespoke quality or multiple
qualities would in fact match the characteristics of service-
delivering technologies and appliances, and could therefore
lead to a reduction in total resource consumption.
Examples of bespoke quality leading to more efficient
service delivery can be found in each type of infrastructure. In
the case of water, only 50% of the domestic supply needs to be
potable (Butler et al., 2011; Environment Agency, 2007). There
are a number of uses, such as garment washing, toilet flushing
andplantwatering,which could be supported bywater that has
been treated to a lower standard such as grey-water (i.e.
wastewater from all sources except the toilet) or treated
sewerage effluent. For electricity, this is even more dramatic,
as shown in Fig. 2, where the majority of the current household
communication and lightning appliances actually use DC and
have to be supplied with rather inefficient (i.e. about 50%) AC/
DC converters (Calwell and Reeder, 2002). The bulk consump-
tion appliances for sustenance and hygiene (e.g. refrigerator,
freezer, dishwasher, washing machine and tumble dryer)Fig. 2. Total 2011UK domestic power consumption by different services and formof ele
in yellow arrows). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, t
Data from DECC (2011).currently rely on AC. However, they could be replaced with
appliances using more efficient and less maintenance
intensive DC pumps and motors, which would offer a 60%
efficiency gain (von Weizsacker et al., 1998). For transporta-
tion, the majority of car use is for recurring single person
transport trips (e.g. commuting and education) (DFT, 2011),
and thus replaceable with public transport, car-pooling or car
sharing schemes. In the case of gas, high quality and pressure
standards restrict the use of potentially more sustainable fuels
such as biogas and hydrogen from waste. Another example is
district heating with various qualities required for residential,
commercial and industrial heating purposes. In the domestic
context room temperature is rarely above 20–22 °C provided
through comparably small high temperature heaters, estab-
lishing a technical barrier for efficient low temperature central
heating systems. In addition hot water is often provided over
50 °C although the mixed used is only 37 °C (Environment A,
2007).
An example of a well-accepted bespoke quality service
delivery is waste removal infrastructure, where different
quality waste streams are segregated (DEFRA, 2011). Separate
waste storage containers and different collection vehicles are
provided according to the waste type. As a consequence,
recycling and higher resource efficiency are possible. When
waste separation systems are managed appropriately, the
resource to production cycle is more effective as a result of
reduced processing requirements and contamination (Bovea
et al., 2010).
Technically, it would be possible to provide utilities at
multiple bespoke quality levels better adapted to the needs of
the end-user: for example providing non-potable water or
direct current power to support appropriate services. These
bespoke quality utilities could be delivered through central
distribution, or could be supported by local generation, forctricity [TJ/year] (i.e. alternating current (AC) red arrows anddirect current (DC)
he reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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or heat generation. Moreover, many of the technologies for
providing bespoke service quality are readily available and
implemented for off-grid applications at remote locations or in
mobile homes.
Of course, despite the potential efficiency benefits, there are
several challenges associated with an implementation of a
bespoke quality service delivery.2.4.1. Regulation
Service delivery, in particular for water and electricity is
currently heavily regulated, in the former case led from the EU,
making change a difficult and long-term endeavour. Bespoke
quality would not only imply a change in service delivery
regulation, but require new construction (e.g. plumbing and
wiring) and appliance standards. Pilot-level exceptions from
regulation may be a necessary intermediate step.2.4.2. Safety/quality
Safety and quality issues are a core concern of regulatory
development, shifting safety considerations from the end-user
to the provider. Bespoke quality services, such as higher voltage
DCor lower qualitywater, transfer someof the responsibility to
the end-users, and forces them to take a more active role in
their safety. For non-potable water delivery for example,
quality issues have been found to be the main challenge
(Dixon et al., 1999).2.4.3. Reliability
Current infrastructure is understandably designed for high
levels of reliability. Paradoxically, for most uses, with the
exception of transportation, a much lower level of reliability
would be acceptable (e.g. Sullivan et al., 1996). This could result
in significant resource savings by reducing back-up needed to
support reliability (e.g. gas power plant operation at most
efficient loads), and would also help integration of renewables
(e.g. biogas in gas networks).2.4.4. Infrastructure supply network investments
Massive sunk investments in current physical infrastructure
supply networks (e.g. power and water), represent a barrier to
additional central generation of bespoke quality infrastructure
products. Local generation of such infrastructure products (e.g.
in-house central AC/DC conversion and DC distribution) could
be one way to overcome this barrier and open a market for
appliances using such bespoke quality directly (e.g. large
domestic DC appliances).2.4.5. End-user practice
High standards allow for a maximum flexibility of end-user
behaviours, which would be necessarily limited by a bespoke
quality delivery. Such intervention may lead to additional
resistance to accepting new standards. More proactive con-
sumers however could demonstrate benefits (e.g. reduced
cost) and facilitate a transition towards resource efficient
infrastructure operation, in accordance with smart appliance
providing user-friendly feedback, and able to cope with safety
and reliability issues.3. From data to action
3.1. Challenges enabling action through feedback
Integrating the end-user into infrastructure operation and
realising MUSCo models of infrastructure require an appropri-
ate interface to be created between the user and the
infrastructure. Such an interface must provide feedback to the
user — in the form of data, information and knowledge
captured and processed by interconnected Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) systems (i.e. smart systems)
spanning the different infrastructure streams. Providing feed-
back at the user–infrastructure interface has the potential to
reduce resource demand, by supporting resource efficient
decision-making and catalysing behaviour change. Under-
standing the nature of this interface, and the type of feedback
it would provide, is therefore critical to achieving the goal of
our work — to incentivise and ensure resource-efficient
operation at the end-user level.
In the future, it is likely that the user–infrastructure
interface will present feedback to the user from across
interconnected smart systems — e.g. smart home and building
management systems, and smart electricity, water, heat or
transport networks. Such systems will be underpinned by the
pervasive deployment of ICT across infrastructure— employing
technological paradigms such as the Internet of Things (Atzori
et al., 2010). For example, in the context of the electricity
network, a smart electricity grid with innovative dynamic tariff
structures is envisioned to play a key role in demand reduction
and demand response, providing feedback to the user and
promoting behaviour change (Rahimi and Ipakchi, 2010).
Many competing interests and perspectives (e.g. techno-
logical, ethical, and security) will need to be reconciled when
designing an appropriate user–infrastructure interface. To date,
there has been limited success in the design of applications at
this user–infrastructure interface. For example, smart (electric-
ity) meters providing feedback on consumption generally have
a limited impact on informing decision-making or catalysing
behaviour change (Darby, 2010; Hargreaves et al., 2010;
AECOM, 2011). In the following we elaborate on the key
challenges in designing the user–infrastructure interface.
3.1.1. The user-orientated, integrated infrastructure vision calls for
an atypical use of feedback
Typical feedback, provided by ICT systems, is either
employed in a business context to enable organisational
objectives to be met; or presented in a domestic context as a
by-product of fulfilling a specific user need. At the user–
infrastructure interface, feedback would be presented to the
user across domains (domestic, leisure, work and transit) to
enable an overarching societal need to be met (i.e. resource
efficiency). In this case the usual drivers of organisational
control and specific user need are both absent, with the
feedback provided seeking to make users aware of often
unconscious and habitual consumption behaviours.
3.1.2. Interoperability in a complex system of actors with
competing interests
Ensuring that feedback can be presented at the user–
infrastructure interfacewill require the interoperability (i.e. the
ability to interact directly to exchange and use data) of smart
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be able to communicate with each other to provide feedback to
users in a consistent way, whilst appliances connected to the
systems should not interfere with each other's operation. A
review of building automation interoperability (Ferreira et al.,
2010) suggests that major interoperability challenges are likely
where subsystems come from multiple manufacturers and are
developed on heterogeneous technologies.
3.1.3. Big data
The large-scale adoption of smart systems and infrastruc-
ture (as discussed above) has the potential to create a deluge of
‘big data’ (Hey and Trefethen, 2003). Deriving value from such
vast quantities of data presents major potential challenges in
processing data to creatively distill and communicate the
information and knowledge that will drive resource efficient
decision-making (at individual user, community and organisa-
tion scales). Examples of the potential impact of ‘big data’ are
emerging, for instance on a community or neighbourhood scale,
through spatial mapping of energy consumption and related
CO2 emissions on a house-by-house level (Gupta, 2009).
3.2. Guiding principles in designing the user–infrastructure
interface
To address the challenges in designing the user–
infrastructure interface outlined above, and the many others
likely to emerge when reconciling competing perspectives and
interests, we propose the adoption of a whole system, socio-
technical perspective (Cherns, 1987).Within such an approach
we suggest that adopting the guiding principles below will be
critical to designing a user–infrastructure interface that both
meets user requirements and drives resource efficient infra-
structure operation. The three principles derive from the
required form of feedback, the balance between automation
and decision-making, and from ethical concerns raised with
extensive data exchange.
3.2.1. Presenting feedback at the user–infrastructure interface in
an appropriate and context dependent form
The Electric Power Research Institute (Neenan et al., 2009)
reviewed research on the use of feedback, to drive resource
efficient decision-making by end-users and catalyse behaviour
change, and suggested that feedback is most effective when it
is:
• presented clearly and simply;
• provided frequently, as soon as possible after a completed
behaviour (so, for example, if an occupant turns up the
central heating, the display immediately shows the amount
of energy that is being used);
• presented relative to a meaningful standard of comparison
(for example, kWh m−2, litres of water used per day, costs);
• provided over a long time period; and
• customised to a household's specific circumstances.
3.2.2. Ensuring automated decision-making is used appropriately
Striking a balance between automation and allowing users
to make consumption-related decisions (rather than seeking
maximum degree of automation) offers the possibility of
reducing demand in a way that integrates with the user'slifestyle — e.g. in a smart home context (Rashidi and Cook,
2009), and enables learning from their choices to deliver
bespoke decision support.
In order to drive and enable demand reduction it will be
necessary to create a two-way flow of data, information and
knowledge across the user–infrastructure interface. Such a flow
creates both the potential for misuse of data, information and
knowledge, and associated user concern about potentialmisuse,
that must be addressed — e.g. the privacy concerns associated
with smart electricity grids (McDaniel and McLaughlin, 2009).
There is little doubt about that pervasive ICT systems will
underpin future infrastructure systems at the user–infrastruc-
ture interface due to their benefits on various levels. Without
coordination however, they might provide inappropriate
feedback, lead to over-automation, and open a range of
concerns about data security. Coordination between ICT system
and appliance manufacturers, service providers, and end-users
on the other hand offers significant potential for a more
resource efficient infrastructure operation. This has to be
facilitated by considering the complex interrelations between
infrastructure streams, and through innovative governance and
infrastructure operation schemes designed to overcome
existing market and regulatory failures. Cross-organisational
e-contracting is one of the examples where complex interre-
lations and business processes are facilitated through more
elaborate use of ICT (Rouached et al., 2005).
4. New thinking through infrastructure integration
4.1. Complexity
The transition to a new, user-centric approach to infra-
structure operation requires a systemic approach to change.
Infrastructure cannot be understood as a set of discrete
technologies but must be seen as a complex, interconnected
system of technology embedded in society and the environ-
ment, interacting with public and private institutions; it can be
described as both a socio-technical system (Unruh, 2000) and
an ecological-economic system (Costanza, 1989). Interconnec-
tion occurs among different technical infrastructure systems
(for example the use of energy in water and wastewater
treatment) (CST, 2009; Rinaldi et al., 2001) and between
technical and socio-economic systems (Foxon, 2011; Hall et al.,
2012, 2014).
Interactions within this complex system mean that it is
unstable and unpredictable: the outcome of intervention into
the system is difficult to forecast; feedback loops make it
difficult to distinguish cause from effect; there are significant
time and spatial lags; and relationships are non-linear resulting
in thresholds (transition points between alternative states)
(Costanza et al., 1993; Liu et al., 2007). Small historic events can
favour the initial adoption of a particular, often inferior,
technology (such as the AC distribution system described in
Section 2.4). Once a technology is established, systemic
interactions between technologies, infrastructures, institutions
and users can increase the returns to adoption of that
technology and constrains the development and adoption of a
superior one (Unruh, 2000; Arthur, 1989). This phenomenon of
path dependency can lock us into inefficient technologies and
behaviours and limit the potential of intervention to create
disruptive change.
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using evolutionary concepts of variation, retention and selec-
tion (Norgaard, 1994; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Individuals
and organisations can acquire (and drop) routines, skills, traits
and assets and thereby rapidly evolve to match their environ-
ments. Mutual causal influences among technical systems and
between technical and social systems mean that the activities
in one system can influence selection criteria and replicative
capacity in other systems (Foxon, 2011). The separate and
parallel governance of technical infrastructure systems is not
designed to respond to these influences, leading to financial
and operational inefficiencies (CST, 2009).
Understanding change, or transitions, as a co-evolutionary
process “highlights the uncertain, path-dependent and cumula-
tive nature of systems change” and helps to identify interven-
tions that recognise the interconnectedness of infrastructure,
with the potential for overcoming system lock-in (Foxon,
2011); hence the proposal of radically new arrangements, such
as MUSCos. MUSCos inherently cover a multitude of policy
fields, including climate change, fuel poverty, energy security,
water resource management and housing quality, engage a
wide range of stakeholders and cross territorial boundaries.
This presents significant challenges to the current siloed
governance system and significant institutional reform is
necessary to enable better inter-policy co-ordination and
regional co-operation (Monstadt, 2007).
4.2. Market and governance failures
Infrastructure provides a public service; therefore, the
services it delivers need to be acceptably reliable, of adequate
quality and quantity, and offer value for money. Little (2005)
and Frischmann (2005) go further and suggest that infrastruc-
ture is a common good which is non-excludable and requires
continual replenishment to deliver reliability and quality.
Government (de)regulation is intended to ensure function-
ing of utility markets. State regulation is commonly applied to;
ensure fair access and to prevent excessive pricing in natural
monopolies, avert collusion and the building of anti-
competitive market share, ensure right of access, consumer
protection and the security of supply in retail markets (BIS,
2011). However, regulation has not always succeeded in
achieving these aims. Regulations targeting specific market
malfunctions often result in novel market problems, which in
their turn demand a regulatory response, and so on. Some
liberalisation policies, designed to increase competition in a
former monopoly, can hinder long-term competition if they
handicap some competitors on an ongoing basis (Armstrong
and Sappington, 2006). We argue that a multi-utility service
perspective would enable regulation aiming at the real benefits
of public services, avoiding more short-sighted and over-
targeted measures.
In the UK, for example, the privatisation of the electricity
and water sectors, originally designed to overcome public
sector inefficiencies, resulted in new problems and challenges.
In a recent review of UK energy, Thomas (2006) notes that the
British electricity reforms are viewed as a model worldwide,
but that this reputation is undeserved. One of the most
important issues is the failure of government intervention
to develop efficient wholesale markets, which means that
competition is only created if consumers switch suppliersregularly, which does not happen in practice. This is supported
by a recent review by the UK energy regulator (OFGEM, 2011)
which finds that consumers are at risk from market features
that reduce the effectiveness of competition, including:
complex pricing structures, which create an obstacle to
switching suppliers; the dominant market shares of the
incumbents, which acts as a barrier to new entrants; and, the
disconnection between wholesale cost decreases and energy
price decreases. In addition, the economic regulation system
designed to enhance competition in the network via price
controls has limited the investment of electricity network
companies in transformative infrastructure. It also restricts
their ability to make profit by any means other than increasing
throughput, which disincentivises demand management and
alternative models of delivery, such as Energy Service Compa-
nies (ESCos). These problems are also found in Canada and the
USA that use similar privatization and regulatory models
(Boland et al., 2011). Attempts have been made to move
away from network price control to incentivise innovation,
such as theUK's newRIIO (revenue= incentives+ innovation
+ outputs) model for gas and electricity distribution charges,
which encourages investment in innovation, notably on the
demand side (OFGEM, 2010).
Similarly, the privatization of water supply in England and
Wales is regularly characterised as a success (Bakker, 2005),
whereas in reality the government was unable to introduce
true competition and cost-reflective pricing. This has reduced
the effectiveness of market mechanisms and required a
significant degree of subsequent regulation to improve water
quality standards, encourage water conservation and control
pricing. In some circumstances this has resulted in a reversal of
privatization (Ohemeng and Grant, 2008). Indeed the narrow
definition of economic efficiency used in regulation may
actually deter water conservation (Bakker, 2005).
Existing infrastructure, market structures and governance
structures have evolved in different jurisdictions in different
ways (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008). Major interventions by
governments have often been motivated by ideological con-
siderations, whilst regulations have been focused on address-
ing specific perceived problems in the context of the state of the
infrastructure and governance regimes at a specific time.
Commercial suppliers respond to government interventions
in the context of their business strategies and perceived profit
opportunities; and regulators respond in turn to perceived
issues arising from those commercial responses. These activi-
ties tend to be narrowly focused on short term issues such as
consumer detriment, utility price or security of supply and
relate primarily to individual supply streams. These mecha-
nisms are not sufficient to address longer term strategic issues
such as climate change and the need to minimise the
consumption of scarce natural resources. It is only by moving
beyond the separate regulation of different infrastructure
networks, and focusing on the actual services delivered by
infrastructure, that environmentally-coherent and efficient
regulation and markets can occur.
4.3. Innovative governance & operation
The complexity and interdependence of infrastructure
systems, both technically and socio-economically, requires
that any action to intervene must recognise both the historic
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limit the potential of disruptive change. Overcoming lock-in
requires systemic action that cuts across policy sectors, public
and private institutional boundaries and state jurisdictions
(Smith, 2007). This systemic action also needs to address both
the cross-sectoral interactions during infrastructure operation
and the integration of infrastructure systems at the end-user.
Precedents of the transformational change required stem
from innovative governance and operation including; those
where institutions have taken on a new role and intervened
directly in infrastructure service provision, those where
innovation and research is enabled or encouraged, those
where alternative business models have driven transformative
change in service delivery and resource consumption, and
those that have exploited opportunities for infrastructure
integration.
The key challenge is to identify the conditions under which
these precedents can become mainstream, and in particular to
identify appropriate governance arrangements. Many of the
alternatives described below require the involvement of a
broad range of actors in order to be innovative, successful and
durable (Furlong and Bakker, 2010). Private companies are
worse at engaging non-state actors and are less likely to deliver
public benefits, whichwould suggest that an increasing role for
public sector organisations in infrastructure delivery would be
beneficial (Furlong and Bakker, 2010; da Cruz and Marques,
2012). It has been suggested that public–private partnerships
(PPPs) might overcome the high resource costs of solely public
sector ventures. However, PPPs are subject to a great deal of
criticism, and face challenges in attaining a balance between
public and private objectives, so arrangements must be
appropriate to the particular project and capabilities of the
actors involved (da Cruz andMarques, 2012; Sohail et al., 2005;
Koppenjan and Enserink, 2009).
Direct intervention into service provision has been
successfully implemented by Woking Borough Council,
which recycles savings from energy efficiency into construc-
tion of low-carbon energy systems to provide affordable
energy to residents. This initiative was made possible by a
more integrated, outcome focused approach to problem
framing, which aligned strategies from several different
policy sectors (e.g. climate change mitigation and housing
renewal). This resulted in more effective intervention that
reduced negative unintended consequences (Smith, 2007;
Leach et al., 2010). The barriers to this kind of approach
include procurement rules, financing arrangements and an
inability to prioritise whole-life cost over short-term funding
cycles in the public sector (Hannon, 2012).
Investment in innovation and transformative research is
essential to deliver disruptive technologies and practices
(CST, 2009). This kind of research and investment can be
encouraged if infrastructure is considered to be a strategic issue
(Cooremans, 2007, 2012). There have been examples of
infrastructure organisations investing in technologies, where
a combination of drivers, such as climate change, energy prices
and tight regulatory controls, increase the strategic importance
of investment. Despite this, regulation could present a barrier,
where it discourages investment through price regulation, as
is the case in the UK water and energy industries. This is
exacerbated in the UK water industry by short investment
planning cycles which limit flexibility over payback periods.In addition to innovating to deliver the same business
model more efficiently, there is a growing trend in infrastruc-
ture companies, particularly energy companies, delivering
different business models under the guise of Energy Service
Companies (ESCos) (Steinberger et al., 2009). These include
Energy Supply Contracting (where the contractor is responsible
for supplying useful energy) and Energy Performance
Contracting (where the contractor takes responsibility for
reducing throughput of energy needed to provide energy
services) (Hannon, 2012). Drivers for adoption of these new
business models include the increasing focus of regulation and
stakeholders on sustainability and rising energy prices. How-
ever, regulation designed to disband monopolies and encour-
age cost efficiency could present barriers to wide-scale
adoption (Hall et al., 2012).
Awareness of the opportunities presented through more
integrated infrastructure operation is increasing. A recent
review of water saving trials in the UK reported not just the
water savings but also the energy and carbon dioxide savings
that resulted from reductions in hot water consumption and
energy required during water treatment (Waterwise et al.,
2011). The report recommended amore integrated approach to
the roll out of energy and water efficiency measures.
These alternative approaches provide promising examples
of transformative changes at the niche scale; however, the scale
of efficiency improvements required would necessitate a step
change in the rate of adoption of these alternative approaches
and support in application at a larger scale. We need a more
creative and systemic approach to governance to encourage
and enable this step change.
5. Infrastructure as though infrastructure mattered
There are many problems related to the ways in which
infrastructure is valued, leading to challenges in investing in
sustainable infrastructure, or operating existing infrastructure
sustainably. For instance, widespread capital depreciation rates
may not apply to long-lived infrastructure. Moreover, the value
of infrastructure, as a public service, in enabling the functioning
of societies, is notoriously difficult to quantify, since the
positive (and negative) impacts of infrastructure are often
indirect (through intermediary activities and actors) and
diffuse in space and time.
In particular, the operational phase – i.e. post-installation
and commissioning – of infrastructure is systematically under-
valued. A cost is attached to the construction of infrastructure
assets, such as road and bridges, and often to maintaining
assets to ensure they continue to serve their original function,
but not to the value generated by their utility in delivering a
service to society (Little, 2005). Infrastructure undervaluation
increases decay, since investors are reluctant to fund the
necessary initial quality to ensure longevity, and/or mainte-
nance programs get squeezed. This inhibits investment in
more sustainable systems, since the returns, i.e. return on
value, are unclear (CST, 2009; Infrastructure UK, 2010). A
further challenge is the need for infrastructure to be operated
in an openly accessible manner that allows all users to access
infrastructure services on equal and non-discriminatory
terms (Frischmann, 2012). This makes it difficult for us to
determine how to ‘make money’ from the sustainable opera-
tion of infrastructure.
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service and well-being provided, but for some indirect or even
unconnected measure thereof (e.g. gas, not heat; a flat-rate for
water supply and waste disposal; and road tax, not miles
travelled). This focus on the physical infrastructure rather than
the service it provides is unhelpful; however it arises because it
is easier tomeasure cost/price than it is tomeasure value. Truly
cost-reflective pricing is further hindered by regulated price
controls deemed necessary to ensure non-discriminatory
access (for example in the water industry) or indirect cost
recovery (for example through road taxing) (NAO, 2013). The
narrow definition of economic efficiency used, particularly
when setting pricing formulae, incentivises increasing demand
as a means to increase profits (Bakker, 2005). It actively deters
operating regimes which maximise resource efficiency.
An alternative approach to infrastructure valuation during
operation would be to quantify the service delivered by the
infrastructure, such as thermal comfort or access to employ-
ment, education and leisure. The valuation would also include
indirect services — the value provided by the other services
enabled by this asset i.e. as a result of interdependency/
interconnections. It should be noted that the valuation of
infrastructure services should not be equated to charging
customers for this value: charging schemes should take into
account considerations of equity, progressive pricing (afford-
able for basic services,more expensive for luxury uses), but also
include environmental externalities. A full discussion of the
valuation-charging topic is obviously beyond the scope of this
paper, but would be interesting for future research.
There are further benefits to an infrastructure valuation
approach centred on services: the focus of investment is likely
to move from investment in new capacity to investment in
demand management, since this is where the most significant
cost savings can be found; some assets might be retired or
converted to a new use because they are not central to
delivering the service; and maintenance regimes are likely to
become more active and consider the long-term value of the
infrastructure asset in delivering the desired service.
6. Getting there from here
Long-term sustainability in infrastructure operation can only
be achieved through a radical transition from the current mode
of operation to one incentivising essential service delivery at
the lowest possible level of resource use (Steinberger et al.,
2009). This paper discusses a number of issues that need to be
addressed to enable this transition away from supply of
unmanaged demand towards resource-efficient service deliv-
ery. In the following we synthesise our findings from consider-
ing micro- and macro-level changes.
6.1. Micro-level
The importance of engaging end-users: Since the most
promising resource efficiency technologies appear to be on
the demand side, most of the identified barriers and enablers
for more efficient infrastructure operation through diffusion of
efficient technologies are end-user related (Grubler et al., 2012;
Wilson et al., 2012).
The potential of the service/performance perspective: which
offers an alternative view on how efficient, cost-effectivetechnologies and alternative operationmodes could be brought
into the mainstream.
Technological vs. behavioural change: resource consumption
of a service is ultimately determined by the end-users' final
demand level, choice of active appliance, its passive context
(Cullen et al., 2011; Cullen and Allwood, 2010) and patterns of
use and maintenance.
Bespoke quality instead of arbitrary standards: Bespoke
quality, or multiple qualities, are better matches for the actual
characteristics of services or resources needed, rather than
conventional or arbitrary standards, and could lead to a
reduction in resource consumption.
The interface between the user and infrastructure: by provid-
ing feedback, thiswill enable resource efficient decision-making
and catalyse behaviour change, but only if provided in a user-
friendly way.
6.2. Macro-level
Infrastructure systems are complex and interconnected: we
need to recognise this interconnectedness and examine the co-
evolution of technology, end-users, businesses and institutions
and their causal interactions.
The challenge of problem shifting: privatisation of infrastruc-
ture, intended to overcome public sector inefficiencies, has
obliged government to regulate to address new types ofmarket
failure. We need to recognise complexity and focus on system-
wide goals to avoid shifting problems back and forth between
markets and regulation.
More innovative governance and operation: this might
include alternative problem framing and investment strategies
as well as integrating infrastructure streams, including new
actors at different scales.
Appropriate valuation of infrastructure services: infrastruc-
ture, in particular in its operational phase, is undervalued,
which drives decay, misdirects investment, and incentivises
demand.
6.3. Next steps
These challenges cannot be addressed in the current,
throughput-based system of infrastructure operation. We
need to accelerate the transition to alternative infrastructure
operation configurations which incentivise resource efficiency.
Multi-Utility Service Companies, or MUSCos, the new type of
actor we described in the introduction could contribute to this
transition since they are: centred on the end-user and their
demand for services; concerned with implementing resource
efficiency improvements; and take into accountmultiple utility
streams simultaneously.
The widespread adoption of a MUSCo configuration is
currently constrained by a number of barriers including lack
of trust and experience, lock-in to mainstream technologies
and operation modes, high transaction costs associated with
creating and monitoring contracts and the fragmented and
entrenched regulatory and policy framework (Roelich et al.,
2013). There is a need for innovative research involving
partnerships between academia, localities and industry, which
investigates particular aspects of the challenge, but hopefully
builds towards a system-wide transition. The academic side of
the partnership should moreover be interdisciplinary, including
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science), economics, and engineering, as well as computer
science, for example, and also integrative, so that the outcomes
are not reflective of one single field, but rather bring together
the different disciplines to provide answers to core research
questions. For example, insights from the micro- and macro-
level considerations we outline above could be integrated into
a socio-technical modelling framework for use in order to test
theories or hypotheses of different factors of change in within
this complex system.
Indeed, we recommend a multi-scale approach to this new
research area. Micro-studies, focusing on a small number of
end-users, or specific technologies, should be conducted with a
high level of detail, in order to bring out unexpected outcomes,
and generate results that are reflective of the diversity of end-
user behaviour even within a specific neighbourhood or
industry sector. Meso-studies, at the community or industrial
sector level, are important because they will highlight the
crucial role of diverse actors, in terms of their relations,
expertise and incentives, including contradictory incentives,
but also possibly unexpected new types of relations and
collaborations which will be necessary for MUSCo infrastruc-
ture operation. Macro-studies, comparing infrastructure gov-
ernance and policies (including procurement policies) are
necessary to understand and change constraints on service-
based infrastructure from high-level regulatory bodies. This
research should be conducted across Europe, in different
national contexts, in order to develop a European strategy on
sustainable infrastructure operationwhichmaximises resource
efficiency and prioritises service delivery over throughput
volume.
Truly sustainable infrastructure operation needs to move
away from the status quo based on provisioning unconstrained
demand, and the research outlined above will chart and
accelerate the way forward.
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